Dr. Lucas Thorpe
Istanbul 34342, Turkey
Phone: (+90) 212 359 6558
Thursday May 26th 15.00-17.00
This presentation defends the view that the simplest forms of mind minding those of the sort required for engaging with and keeping track of anothers mental states are best understood and explained in non-representational, enactivist terms. There is no doubt that in many cases it would not be possible to attend to other minds if we did not bring our full-fledged folk psychological skills to bear. But it is far from obvious that all, or even the most common, forms of mind minding requires this. For example, the ways in which pre-verbal infants initially begin to triangulate and engage with adults around the time of their first birthday arguably do not. This seems equally true of the ways in which adult humans jointly attend to, and engage with, other minds in many cases of on-line, fast and efficient social interaction. An enactivist account of elementary mind minding is shown to be a live conceptual possibility by demonstrating how it can coherently derived by abandoning three representationalist commitments of existing cognitivist models. And it will also be shown why doing so is well motivated if it should turn out that there is (1) no reason to believe that basic forms of mentality are representational (in a semantically contentful way) and (2) if no good theory is likely to explain how they could be so.
The slides for this talk can be found at: