This page shows the past departmental events. To see the upcoming events, you can refer to the upcoming events page.
Please choose a year from the list:
| 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
“Kant on the Highest Good”
"Conceptual Cognitive Organs: Toward a Historical Materialist Theory of Scientific Knowledge"
Tim Williamson (Oxford)
“Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality”
(Tim will also be teaching a session of Lucas Thorpe’s graduate seminar on Thursday)
29.11.2012 - 30.11.2012
@Ken Westphal (East Anglia/ Bielefeld)
Thursday November 29th, 5-7pm, TB130
“Conventionalism & the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons”
Friday November 30th, 5-7pm TB130
“Natural Law, Social Contract & Moral Objectivity: Rousseau’s Natural Law Constructivism”
Mehmet Elgin (Mugla)
“What is Science? Popper and Evolutionary Theory”
ABSTRACT: Karl R. Popper notoriously claimed that "I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme-a possible framework for testable scientific theories" (Popper, Unended Quest, p. 195). He later claimed that "The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true" Popper (1978), "Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind", Dialectica, p. 345-346. When Popper claimed that evolutionary theory is a metaphysical research program, he was relying on an a priori philosophical principle about scientific methodology. When he changed his mind, he was reformulating a scientific principle in a way that it would satisfy the conditions of to be scientific proposed by him on a priori grounds. Thus, Popper was judging the status of empirical science on the basis of a priori philosophical intuitions concerning scientific methodology that did not take scientific practice seriously. I find this approach quite problematic and I propose to show why such a strategy of doing philosophy of science hinders our understanding of science by focusing on the role and the function of the Hardy-Weinberg Law in population genetics.
“Brians, Mind and Language #2”
A philosophy/cognitive science workshop.
Oliver Wright (Bachesehir) “The Whorfian (linguistic relativity) Hypothesis and Empirical Investigations in the Domain of Color.”
Annette Hohenberger (ODTU) “The Understanding of Normativity, Free Will and Emotions in Preschool Children.”
Emrah Aktunc “Tackling Duhemian Problems in Functional Neuroimaging.”
Friday November 23rd – 5-7pm, TB130
Volkan Çıdam (Kemerburgaz)
“The Role of Historical Narration in Marx's Capital”
Aziz Zambak (Yeditepe) will give a talk at Bogazici on Friday November 16th 5-7pm, in TB130:
“The Frame Problem: A Solution From an Agentive
Aziz Fevzi Zambak received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. He is currently a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at Yeditepe University, Istanbul. His areas of specialization include Wittgenstein, artificial intelligence, philosophy of information, and logic.
ABSTRACT. “Yes, but you will never get a machine to do X” This is a commonsensical objection to AI in which X refers to the main problems of AI such as pattern recognition, creativity, free will, autonomy, systematicity, understanding, learning etc. The frame problem is at the intersection of all these problems. In AI, the realization of X depends on the solution of the frame problem. The frame problem has three aspects namely, metaphysical, logical, and epistemological. Three aspects of the frame problem consider the issue from a designer point of view. The frame problem is not the problem of a machine intelligence designer but the problem of the machine intelligence. I propose three steps in order to build an autonomous approach to the frame problem. These steps are (1) the agentification of the frame problem, (2) a control system approach, and (3) a trans-logical model peculiar to AI. Each step towards building an autonomous approach to the frame problem depends on each other.
“From Aristotle to Heloise: Virtue and Moderation.”
Friday November 9th,5-7pm, Bogazici University Philosophy Department, TB130. Everyone welcome.
ABSTRACT: While many of her contemporaries, and some significant predecessors saw the virtues, especially that of temperance, as perfect achievements and complete freedom from bodily impulses, Heloise was keen to reinstate the Aristotelian understanding of virtues as means between two extremes. In her letters, she defends the ideal of moderation against Abelard’s calls for struggle and self control, and in doing so, she uses the vocabulary of the mean, in very much the same way as John of Salisbury did some years later. In this paper I highlight Heloise’s position in that debate, and argue that it is of philosophical and historical significance.
"Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument"
Gordon Bearn (Lehigh) will be giving a talk on:
“Feeling Words: An Attitude to Linguistic Life”
Emrah Aktunc on “Determining the Underdetermined:
Evidence, Inference, and Knowledge in Cognitive
Emrah Aktunc (Koc) will be giving a talk at Bogazici on
“Determining the Underdetermined: Evidence, Inference, and Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience.”
Thursday, October 18th from 5-7pm in TB130.
ABSTRACT: Brain images have become central elements in contemporary cognitive science, but the reliability of these images as sources of knowledge has been called into question. The epistemological literature on brain imaging has focused mostly on two major issues; one is the question of whether or not cognitive scientific theories are underdetermined by brain imaging data. The other is the general issue of how the methodological complexity of brain imaging lowers the reliability of inferences in cognitive neuroscience. I will argue that the focus on these two issues has overly narrowed the philosophical discourse on brain imaging and hindered gaining fruitful insights into general questions regarding the kind of knowledge we can gain from brain imaging studies. I will approach the general criticisms of brain imaging as problems of scientific evidence and inference and apply Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical account of experimental inquiry to develop a novel and useful conceptualization of these problems. The error-statistical account helps us realistically clarify the evidential import of brain imaging data and address problems of underdetermination. This will give us a more accurate understanding of what, if anything, we can learn from brain imaging and the nature of experimental knowledge in cognitive neuroscience. Finally, I will discuss the implications of my conclusions in the context of recent Wittgensteinian criticisms of cognitive neuroscience.
12.10.2012 - 13.10.2012
There will be a conference at Bogazici University on October 12th and 13th on the metaphysical and moral ramifications of the logic and semantics of mass and plural quantification and predication. The first day consists of educational seminars on the logic and semantics of mass and plural expressions, so people should feel comfortable showing up who know nothing about the topic. Luckily, we will be taught by two world experts on the subject. On day 2 we will get into the ramifications of the topics covered in day 1.
If you have any questions please contact marksteen[at symbol]gmail[dot]com. Registration is free, and all are welcome. Exact locations will be announced soon in the comments below and on the Bogazici Philosophy Department Event Calendar. Links to philosophers’ webpages/information can be found below.
Friday, October 12
12:30-2:00 – Lunch at the Kennedy Lodge
3:15-4:45 – David Nicolas educational seminar: “The Logic of Mass Expressions”
4:45-5:00 – Break
5:00-6:30 – Thomas McKay educational seminar: “Plurals and Distribution”
7:00 – Dinner, location TBA
Saturday, October 13
10-12 – William Wringe: “Who are We, What Are We Doing and Are We Harming the Worst-Off? Pogge’s Problem with Plurals.”
12-1:00 – Lunch on your own
1:00 3:00 – David Nicolas, “Mass Nouns and Plural Logic”
3:00-3:15 – Break
3:15-5:15 – Irem Kurtsal Steen, “LOL! No x is a cat, but some Xs are-a-cat”
5:15-5:30 – Break
5:30-7:30 – Thomas McKay, “From Mass to Plural”
7:30- – Dinner, location TBA
Talk at Bogazici: Dan Korman (UI-UC) on ‘Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects’ Monday, 08/10/2012
Dan Korman (UI-UC) will be giving a talk on ’Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects‘ on Monday October 8th from 17:00-19:00 at Bogazici University, room TB130 (in the philosophy department).
ABSTRACT: On our natural way of “carving up” the world into objects, some collections of objects together compose something (e.g., the trunk and branches of a palm tree) and others do not (the trunk and the dog lying beside it). Reflection on the sorts of factors that might underwrite or influence such judgments about which objects there are give rise to powerful (and under-appreciated) “debunking arguments” against our perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects. I assimilate these arguments to arguments that arise in meta-ethics and the philosophy of math, and I examine a variety of way of trying to resist the arguments
Talk at Bogazici: Wilfried Ver Eecke (Georgetown) on ‘Ethical Reflections on the Financial Crisis 2007-08′ (Friday, 5/10/2012)
Professor Wilfried Ver Eecke (Georgetown) will give a talk on ”Ethical Reflections on the Financial Crisis 2007-08″ at Bogazici University this Friday, October 5th 2012 from 17:00 to 19:00 at Bogazici University. The talk will take place in TB130 (in the philosophy department).
Everyone is welcome.
Wilfried Ver Eecke obtained a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Louvain. He did doctoral and post-doctoral work in Paris (with Ricouer, Hyppolite, Lacan, and Benveniste), in Freiburg/iBr (with Lohmann) and at Harvard (with Putnam, Cavell, Erikson, Jakobson, Kagan, and Brow). He also obtained an M.A. in economics at Georgetown University. Professor Ver Eecke has been teaching at Georgetown since 1967, where he was also Chairman of the Philosophy Department from 1980-1983. He was awarded research grants from the Belgian Science Foundation, the French Government, and the von Humboldt Stiftung. In 1973, he received the annual prize of the Belgian Academy of Sciences and Humanities for a manuscript later published as Negativity and Subjectivity.
His research interests include (1) Hegel; (2) philosophy of psychoanalysis with an emphasis on Lacan — including ethical problems with the treatment of mentally ill persons; (3) ethics and economics — including public policy implications; (4) Contemporary Continental philosophy; (5) the concept of person; and (6) political and social philosophy — including distributive justice.
03.10.2012 - 06.10.2012
Dan Zahavi (Copenhagen) will be giving a talk at Bogazici university on Thursday, September 27th from 5-7pm, entitled ’”Figuring the self: Can we learn anything from philosophy?”
Venue: Turgut Noyan Salonu (North Campus, next to the library)
Abstract: In both ancient and modern times, the existence of self has been called into question. Frequently, the claim of the self-skeptics has been that the self, if it exists, must be some kind of unchanging and ontologically independent entity. Given that no such entity exists, there is no self. In my talk, I will argue that this philosophical definition of self contrasts rather markedly with how the self is approached, understood, and explored in a variety of empirical disciplines, including developmental psychology, social psychology, neuroscience and psychiatry. I will consider two cases in particular, namely research in autism and the study of facial self-recognition. On the basis of these examples, I will discuss how one ought to conceive of the relationship between philosophical analysis and empirical investigation when it comes to the study of self.
Here are some papers that might be good for background reading:
Dan Zahavi: “The experiential self: Objections and Clarifications. ” In M. Siderits, E. Thompson, D. Zahavi (eds.): Self, no self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 56-78.
Dan Zahavi: “Is the self a social construct?“ Inquiry 52/6, 2009, 551-573.
Dan Zahavi: “Self and other: The limits of narrative understanding.” In D.D. Hutto (eds): Narrative and Understanding Persons. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 179-201.
Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Danish National Research Foundation’s Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. Zahavi writes on phenomenology and especially the philosophy of EdmundHusserl. He is co-editor of the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, and author of Intentionalität und Konstitution, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität, Self-awareness and Alterity, Husserl’s Phenomenology, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective,Phänomenologie für Einsteiger, and (with Shaun Gallagher) The Phenomenological Mind.
"Three Puzzles About Spatial Experience"
Tuesday, June 5, 5:30pm, Old Rector's Library (Rektörlük Konferans Salonu).
In the building behind the green kiosk at BU's South Campus.
Details can be found here:
23.05.2012 - 26.05.2012
(Program is updated.)
"Brains, Minds and Language #1″
A workshop Jointly organised by the Bogazici University Philosophy Department and Cog-Sci Program.
Friday May 18th, 1.00pm-5.30 pm, M2180 (Engineering Building).
1.00 – 2.30 pm Alper Açık (Yeditepe/Osnabrück):
"What can a neuroscientist do with phenomenology?"
2.30 – 4.00 pm Kirk Michaelian (Bilkent):
"Epistemology and Metacognition".
4.00 – 5.30 Serife Tekin (Dalhousie/Pittsburgh):
"Making Mental Disorders Amenable to Empirical Investigation: Beyond Natural Kinds"
Abstracts Under the fold:
Kirk Michaelian: "Epistemology and Metacognition"
Abstract: What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should have reasons for trusting others. This talk makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.
Serife Tekin: "Making Mental Disorders Amenable to Empirical Investigation: Beyond Natural Kinds"
Abstract: Empirical research on mental disorders aims to "carve nature at the joints." Philosophers consider the viability of this goal primarily by discussing whether mental disorders are natural kinds, such as animals and quarks. Natural kinds are thought to provide a framework for formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations and predictions about mental disorders and thus some philosophers of psychiatry argue that it is necessary for mental disorders to be taken as natural kinds in order to make them amenable to empirical investigation. In the first part of my talk I challenge this claim. I demonstrate that the debate on the ontological status of mental disorders has so far overlooked the complexity of the self, as well as the complexity of the encounter with mental disorder, and thus has failed to make a fruitful contribution to the empirical investigation of psychopathology. In the second part, I offer a constructive proposal that reintroduces these complexities into the debate by developing an empirically and philosophically plausible model of the self, which I have termed as the multitudinous self. Multitudinous self, incorporating insights offered by cognitive sciences and first-person accounts of psychopathology, offers a richer understanding of mental disorders. By virtue of being empirically tractable, multitudinous self undercuts the need to take mental disorders as natural kinds to make them amenable to scientific investigation.
Abstract: In this paper I will discuss criticisms of morality found in the Daodejing (and other Daoist texts). I will point out how Daoist philosophy can be used for establishing a "negative ethics", i.e. a critical reflection on the potential pathologies of intensely moral communication and thought and the harm it may inflict on individuals and society. I will defend the Daoist model of "moral foolishness."
There are interesting interviews with Moeller here on his book "The Philosophy of the Daodejing" and here on his book "The Moral Fool: A Case for Amorality".
More details can be found here:
Professor Gordon is the founder of Simulation Theory.
“The Shared World in Which Minds Meet”
The title is based on William James, writing against Berkeleian idealism:
“Practically, … our minds meet in a world of objects which they share in common…. Your objects are over and over again the same as mine. If I ask you where some object of yours is, our old Memorial Hall, for example, you point to my Memorial Hall with your hand which I see. If you alter an object in your world, put out a candle, for example, when I am present, my candle ipso facto goes out.” (Radical Empiricism)
In the spirit of this quote, I defend a kind of externalist account of folk psychology, grounded in a hypothesis about shared neural representation. Shared representation (strongly overlapping neural implementation) is well‐established for visualizing and seeing, to give just one example; also, for pain and the perception of pain in others. I describe a kind of shared external representation that would cause us to frame our understanding of others in terms of a Jamesian shared world, by default. It is implicit in this default understanding that others have epistemic access to the world – that is, that the facts (as we ourselves believe them to be) are known to others. Shared representation of this sort would seem to support Williamson’s “knowledge first” thesis in epistemology. Although shared external representation would be consistent with a simulation account of folk psychology, it would be consistent with a pluralistic account as well; however, it would not support your typical “belief‐desire theory” theory.
Georg Northoff (Canada Research Chair in Neuropsychiatry)
Monday April 16th, 5-7pm, M1170 (Engineering Building)
Abstract: Neurophilosophy is a young and novel field right at the intersection between neuroscience and philosophy. Unlike more established disciplines, it has not yet an established method that needs to be developed in the future as part of a future 'Theoretical Neurophilosophy'. At the same time though Neurophilosophy is a highly promising field of the future which will be able to provide novel answers to questions discussed in philosophy since more than 3000 years. This will not only enrich neuroscience and provide new ideas for experimental designs but will also change and reverberate in philosophy itself by allowing for a shift from the hitherto mind-based philosophy to a more brain-based neurophilosophy.
Georg Northoff, MD, PhD, is EJLB-CIHR Michael Smith Chair in Neurosciences and Mental Health and holds a Canada Research Chair for Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics at the University of Ottawa Institute of Mental Health Research (IMHR). He completed his initial training in medicine/psychiatry and philosophy in Germany. Dr. Northoff's previous academic positions included Professorships at the University of Magdeburg, Germany, and Harvard University, U.S.A. With over 100 scientific publications, his current focus is predominantly on the self - having developed the concept of cortical midline structures. Experimental research within his unit focuses on the functional and biochemical mechanisms underlying our sense of self in both healthy subjects and psychiatric patients. In addition to neuroimaging, he also focuses on neuroethical issues. Early on, he investigated issues related to personal identity in patients with deep brain stimulation and brain tissue transplantation. Another neuroethical focus is on the impact of emotions and empathy in the decision making involved in informed consent, which is of particular relevance regarding psychiatric patients.
12.04.2012 - 13.04.2012
on April 12th and 13th, 2012
Here are the details:
"Feeling the Force of Argument", Thursday April 12th ( 5 - 7 pm ) in room M1170
"What Philosophy of Mathematical Practice Can Teach Argumentation Theory about Diagrams and Pictures", Friday, April 13th ( 3 - 5 pm ) in room M1170
Further information can be found at:
05.04.2012 - 06.04.2012
with Graham Priest (Melbourne/CUNY)
and Stephen Read (St Andrews)
Thursday and Friday, April 5th and 6th, 2012, Bogaziçi University , Istanbul, 1pm-6pm in the Turgut Noyan Salonu (North Campus, next to the library)
Graham Priest and Stephen Read are two of the leading contemporary philosophical logicians. Graham is probably the best known proponent of paraconsistent logic and dialetheism. I'll try and write a separate post explaining what this means for those of you who are not familiar with these terms. They are also both important historians of philosophy. Stephen is one of the leading scholars in the world on Medieval logic, and Graham has written quite extensively on the history of philosophy and Asian philosophy. This workshop will include sessions both on the history of philosophy (and logic) and some sessions on contemporary logic. This short piece by Graham in the New York Times might be good background reading for those of you new to this topic.
For background reading Stephen Read has supplied a short article (here) outlining his approach, which is based upon that of the medieval logician Thomas Bradwardine. He has also supplied his recent translation of Bradwardine's Insolubilia (here). Graham Priest has supplied a longer article on paraconsistency and dialetheism, which will be appearing in a handbook of logic (here). Parts of this are quite technical - but the first 20 pages, where he discusses the history of paraconsistency and dialetheism (discussing, amongst other things Aristotle, Plotinus, Hegel and Indian Logic), are quite accessible. Details below the fold. All welcome.
We're discussing Graham's paper in our weekly reading group (which normally takes place on Thursdays from 5-7pm). If any of you would be interested in joining this group, please email me: Lucas (email@example.com).
Thursday April 5th (13.00 - 17.30pm)
1b. Graham Priest: The history of paraconsistency and dialetheism
2b. Stephen Read: Some other semantic paradoxes
3b. Graham Priest: Dialetheism and the paradoxes of semantic self-reference
4b. Stephen Read: The knower paradox
Stephen Read will be giving the following talk:
"General-elimination harmony and the meaning of the logical constants"
You can find the paper for the talk here.
Iulian Toader received his Phd from the University of Notre Dame, where he worked with Michael Detlefsen and Don Howard.
In this paper, I present a view according to which there is a fundamental tension between the conditions required for scientific objectivity and those needed for mathematical understanding: to the extent that it helps one attain objectivity, mathematics may do so only at the expense of understanding, and to the extent that it aims at understanding, may do so only by sacrificing objectivity. I think that this view should be attributed to Weyl and I therefore call it Weylean skepticism. After clarifying what Weyl himself thought were the necessary conditions for understanding and objectivity, I explain why they lead to this type of skepticism. Then I argue that there is no tenable answer to Weylean skepticism in the contemporary literature, which motivates my exploration of some possible responses.
22.03.2012 - 23.03.2012
Andreas Blank (Hamburg) will give two talks at Bogazici on March 22nd and March 23rd.
"Henry More on Existential Dependence and Immaterial Extension", Thursday March 22nd, TB365, 5-7pm
"Aquinas and Soto on Derogatory Judgment and Noncomparative Justice", Friday March 23rd, M1170 (Engineering Building) , 3-5pm.
Respondent: Lars Vinx (Bilkent)
Henry More on Existential Dependence and Immaterial Extension
According to the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, “spirits”—the souls of humans and non-human animals—are extended but cannot be physically divided. Both by his contemporaries and by recent commentators, More has been charged with never giving a full explanation for the physical indivisibility of spirits, thus failing to distinguish immaterial from material extension. In this paper, I will try to defend More against this criticism. In particular, I will point out the importance of the fact that More compares the relation between spirits and matter to the relation that, according to Aristotelian theories of light, holds between “intentional species” and matter. I will argue that the point of this comparison is to highlight the existential independence of both intentional species and spirits from matter. The existential independence of intentional species from matter expresses itself in the fact that light is not moved through the motion of the illuminated body. The existential independence of spirits from matter expresses itself in the fact that when the body that is coextensive with a spirit is divided, the spirit thereby is not divided but rather contracts into the remaining living organism.
Aquinas and Soto on Derogatory Judgment and Noncomparative Justice
In one of his by now classical papers, Joel Feinberg has challenged the view that all justice is essentially comparative. As the clearest examples of noncomparative injustices, Feinberg singles out cases of unfair punishments and rewards, merit grading, and derogatory judgments. His contention is that what is unjust about derogatory judgments is that they are contrary to the truth. In this paper, I will examine some views found in Aquinas and the sixteenth-century Dominican theologian and philosopher Domingo de Sotothat confirm the importance of noncomparative justice but challenge the analysis that Feinberg gives of the injustice of derogatory judgments. Like Aquinas, Soto holds that it is the neglect of relevant evidence that makes derogatory judgments unjust: judgmental injustice, for him, boils down to judging "rashly" (temere). But Soto goes beyond a consideration of the role of evidence for judgmental justice and includes a consideration of natural rights. Taken together, Aquinas’ and Soto’s arguments indicate why the notion of judgmental justice should be severed from the notion of truth: some false derogatory judgments are just, and some true derogatory judgments are unjust.
"Studying Human Behavior: Epistemological,Ontological, and Social Quandaries" Monday, March 19th, 4-6pm, M1170 (Engineering Building).
Information about Helen Longino can be found here:
And here's an interesting survey about feminist philosophy of science:
08.03.2012 - 09.03.2012
(1) Thursday March 8th, 5-7pm, in M1170 (Engineering Building)
“The Relationship of Painting and Art Philosophy in the Landscape Painting of Romanticism.”
Abstract: The lecture is a study of the landscape painting of the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is specifically concerned with the question of how, in Romanticism, the landscape became a locus and an instrument of self-knowledge. The examination of the changes in landscape painting can be summarized thus: the landscape painting was no longer a picture of the landscape, the emphasis shifted from the landscape to the image. Particularly in some landscape paintings of German Romanticism the relationship between world and man, the human predicament is not only examined, but, in addition, that very examination itself is thematised and represented.
(2) Friday March 9th, 3-5pm, in M1170 (Engineering Building)
“The Cultural Landscape and the Shifting Art Centres from the Baroque till Contemporary arts”
Abstract: Analyzing the role of the art centres helps us to understand their function and their relationship with the artists. Through the examination of the question which were and are the significant art centres from the 17 century till today we can also understand how and why they are so attractive, that often lead to a real and constant migration of artists. A special attention will be paid also on the question of how migration and the new context influences the topic and creation of the artwork itself. By analyzing this phenomenon a strong accent will be on the Eastern art scene where, of course, Istanbul too has a particular importance.
To prepare for his visit we have been looking at one of his papers in the philosophy department reading group: "The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness". A copy can be found here: http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1158/Semantic.pdf
We will meet to discuss this paper on Tuesday (21st of Feb) from 5-6pm and Thursday (23rd of Feb) from 5-7pm in TB365. On Tuesday we will probably focus on section 3 of the paper. Everyone is welcome.