PHIL 501.01 (Metaphysics of Material Objects)
Spring 2006

Sun Demirli

TB 450, Fridays, 13:00-14:00 and by appointment

Our primary topic will be the ontology of material objects.  The starting point will be the Leibnizian question concerning composition.  We believe: some objects have others as parts; for example, a number of atoms add up and constitute individual soldiers; and individual soldiers add up together and constitute armies; and so on.  The question here is: Do we accept the existence of composite objects?  And if we do, then under what conditions we will say that a number of objects come together and compose a certain object?  Maybe when they touch each other; or else when they are suitably arranged.  Leibniz’ answer is that there are no composite objects and everything is a simple.  But what happens if Descartes is right and there are no simples?  Then there is nothing; this is the nihilistic answer.  A more generous ontology could be that there are only organisms like you and me and all sorts of animals—there are just things that constitute a life.  But there are no such things as chairs, houses, human heads and animal limbs.  This is the Lockean answer.  And it is defended rigorously in the pages that we will read from Peter van Inwagen. 

The second thread in the course concerns certain problems concerning the philosophy of time.  The philosophy of time is shaped by a certain argument presented by McTaggart.  His argument has the conclusion that the notion of time is incoherent.  But if the notion of time is incoherent then there is no such thing as time.  McTaggart reaches this conclusion by noting a certain difficulty in the notion of time’s flow.  We believe: time flows.  But we may be mistaken.  And time doesn’t flow.  If this is our position then contrary to what McTaggart argues, we may not need to deny the existence of time.  Time may be like space; it is a fourth dimension where material objects are located.  If time is a fourth dimension then time moves or “flows” in the same sense in which your hand moves from east to west.  Or perhaps McTaggart is wrong in his view that there is a difficulty in the notion of time’s flow.  

Then we will turn to our central problem: the problem of change and identity: the problem of change and identity through time. In discussing this problem we will tie together the two threads we have been following during this course.  We all believe that many mid-sized objects persist over time. Me and you, for example, endures through time.  My head or your leg most probably do.  Statues, ships and cars are less likely to be enduring objects.  What is for a thing to persist through time.  Metaphysicians have given us two different answers to this question: three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism.  According to three dimensionalism, for an object to persist over time is for it to exist wholly and in its entirety at several different times.  On this view, temporal persistence is a matter of strict identity.  Where something persists through time, a thing existing wholly and in its entirety at one time is identical with a thing existing wholly and in its entirety at another time.

But if this is so, how can people continue to exist over time? People, in fact, change all of their matter over time.  This takes us to the four dimensionalist answer to the problem of change.  According to four dimensionalism, what exists wholly and in its entirety at one time can never be identical with something existing wholly and in its entirety at another time.  On this view, a thing persists by having different parts—what are called “temporal parts”—existing at different times.  

REQUIREMENTS:

   20 minutes presentations (25%)

   In-class exam (40%)

   Term paper (35%)

COURSE SCHEDULE:

 (The following course schedule is tentative and subject to change.  Changes to the schedule will be announced in class.)

Week of 02/22: van Inwagen on composition

   Material Beings chapters 1-3

Week of 03/01 : more on van Inwagen on composition

   Material Beings chapters 6-8

Week of 03/08 : more on van Inwagen on composition

   Material Beings chapters 9-12

Week of 03/15 : Unger on nihilism and Fine on supervaluation

   Unger, “The Problem of Many”

 Week of 03/22:  McTaggart and the B-theory of time

   McTaggart, "Time: an Excerpt from The Nature of Existence"
   Smart, "The Space-Time World"
   Maybe: Shoemaker, "Time without Change"

Week of 03/29: The A-theory and presentism

   Broad, excerpt from Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy
   Markosian, "How Fast Does Time Pass?"
   Prior, "The Notion of the Present"
   Prior, "Thank Goodness The Pain is Over"

Week of 04/05 : more on presentism and growing salami view

   Bigelow, "Presentism and Properties"
   Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 2
   Braddon-Mitchell, “How do we know it is now now?”

Week of 04/12 : Intro to persistence, four-dimensionalism

   Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 1; chapter 4 sections 1-3, 5
   Sider Four-Dimensionalism chapter 3; chapter 4 section 4

Week of 04/19 : Arguments for four-dimensionalism

   Lewis, “The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics”  (Excerpts from On the  Plurality of Worlds.)
   Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 4, sections 6-9

Week 04/26 : The paradoxes of coincidence: moderate 3D views

Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time"
    Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 5, sections 1-4

Week of 05/10 : The paradoxes of coincidence: extreme 3D views

van Inwagen, "The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"
Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 5, sections 6-7

Week of 05/17 : The paradoxes of coincidence: the stage view

Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 5, section 8

Week 05/24 : Problems for four-dimensionalism

Sider, Four-Dimensionalism chapter 6
van Inwagen, “Four-Dimensional Objects”