THE THIRD THINGS AND THOUGHTS SYMPOSIUM

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY
(27 OCTOBER 2007, Saturday)

 PLACE:  Kriton Curi Meeting Hall (The "Clock Building") 

PROGRAM

First Session

12:30-14:00    Larry Hardin (Syracuse University): KEYNOTE SPEAKER

                        “A Green Thought in a Green Shade”

14:00-14:50    Emre Özgen (Bilkent University)

                        “Language, Learning, and Colour Perception”

14:50-15:30    Coffee Break

Second Session

15:30-16:20    Hilmi Demir (Bilkent University)

“A Methodological Question: the Organism’s Perspective vs. the Observer’s Perspective”

16:20-17:10   István Aranyosi (Bilkent University)

                        “Schmoperties”

17:10-18:00    Murat Baç (Boğaziçi University)

                        “How Soft Can Truth Get?”

ABSTRACTS

C. Larry Hardin - Syracuse University (chardin1@twcny.rr.com)

“A Green Thought in a Green Shade”

Do we have good reasons to identify the colors that we see with spectral reflectances? Since our only access to colors is through sight, if we are to answer the question in the affirmative, we must establish the conditions under which we see the colors of objects as they really are. It turns out that there is a plurality of “normal” illuminants, yielding different color appearances for the same objects, with little to choose between them. Worse yet, there is now substantial empirical evidence that when presented with the same stimuli, “normal” observers do not agree on the colors that they see, and the disagreements are robust. The spectral reflectance account thus fails to get off the ground.

Emre Özgen - Bilkent University (eozgen@bilkent.edu.tr)

“Language, Learning, and Colour Perception”

Colour is perceived categorically. It is not clear whether this is due to innate physiological mechanisms or is learned through environmental influences. One such influence could be language. The proponents of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis have long argued that speakers of different languages with different colour term repertoires may perceive colours differently; i.e. through different category structures. In this talk I will present evidence from our labs consistent with this view. On the one hand we compare speakers of English, and some African languages; on the other, we explore if people can perceptually learn new category boundaries: i.e. if colour perception is modifiable. Our studies use low-level perceptual tasks and threshold estimates, in order to rule out any strategic explanations. We find that around category boundaries, threshold differences exist cross-linguistically, and they can be induced through laboratory category training.

Hilmi Demir - Bilkent University (hilmi@bilkent.edu.tr)

“A Methodological Question: the Organism’s Perspective vs. the Observer’s Perspective”

In this paper, I compare two different ways of studying mental and neural entities: the observer’s perspective and the organism’s perspective. I claim that the nature of mental entities necessitate using the latter perspective. Thus, both empirical sciences (mainly Psychology and Neuroscience) and philosophical theories that focus on mental/neural entities should adopt the animal’s perspective as their main methodology. I provide both neuroscientific and philosophical arguments for this claim. I also analyze Kant’s arguments against the legitimacy of Psychology as an empirical science in order to show why the observer’s perspective is not the right methodology for understanding mental entities.

István Aranyosi - Bilkent University (aranyosi@bilkent.edu.tr)

“Schmoperties”

According to dispositional essentialism (DE), properties have the causal powers they bestow upon objects that instantiate them essentially. DE yields the result that laws of nature, on the condition that they relate properties, are necessary. The question arises as to how to characterize the resulting necessity. I will put forward my version of the basic component theses of DE, and argue that DE entails a new kind of necessitarian view, which I will call 'semi-strong'. Semi-strong necessitarianism (SSN) results from considering (1) a more fine-grained distinction than that between weak and strong necessitarianism about laws, and (2) the commitments regarding properties resulting from (a) the view of causation congenial to DE and (b) the task of providing a Kripkean framework for explaining the intuition of contingency regarding laws. SSN is stronger than weak necessitarianism in that it excludes possible worlds with laws relating alien properties; at the same time, SSN is weaker than strong necessitarianism in that it does not require that all possible worlds contain the actual properties. The coherence of SSN depends on the plausibility of entities that play the property role in some worlds, but are not properties; we might call them 'schmoperties'. I will argue that the idea of schmroperties does indeed make sense, and might be the only option if we are to accommodate both DE and the intuition of contingency regarding laws.

Murat Baç - Boğaziçi University (muratbac@gmail.com)

“How Soft Can Truth Get?”

An immense literature accumulated during the last century about the onto-semantic nature of propositional truth.  While realist philosophers typically defend an objective (or “hard”) notion of truth, anti-realists “soften” it semantically and/or ontologically.  Pluralistic Kantianism is a quasi-realist position comprising the following basic tenets: (1) There is a mind- and language-independent reality that “sustains” phenomenal truths. (2) There exists an internal relation between truths and such semantic constructs as conceptual frameworks.  Hence, the mind-independent reality cannot be the sole “maker” of propositional truths. (3) Yet, truth is not an epistemic property; it is normatively distinct from evidence and epistemic justification.  Although such a composite position does not amount to a total softening of the concept of truth, there are, according to Pluralistic Kantianism, certain significant senses/contexts in which truth-making relations can be said to present themselves in strictly non-realist (“softer”) ways.